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1. Introduction 
 
Social security is a pillar of the welfare state in several developed countries, and is essentially based 
on pay-as-you-go (PAYG) public pensions, i.e. current workers finance benefits to current 
pensioners. The fertility crisis that has affected and indeed still affects a lot of countries around the 
world (e.g., Germany, Italy, Japan and Spain) is threatening the viability of public pension budgets, 
as the number of young contributors is steadily falling and the number of old beneficiaries is 
steadily rising (due to also the reduced adult mortality). Motivated by the thrift of both ageing and 
below-replacement fertility on the existence of the widespread PAYG systems, pension reforms are 
currently high on the political agendas of many governments, especially in Europe (see, e.g., Boeri 
et al., 2001, 2002; Blinder and Krueger, 2004). 
    As a remedy against the potential negative effects of the fertility crisis on PAYG pensions, it has 
been suggested, amongst other things, to incentive families to have more children in order to 
increase the ratio of economically active to total population, for instance through the public 
provision of child allowances (van Groezen et al, 2003; van Groezen and Meijdam, 2008). 
Moreover, linking the size of the pension arrangement received when by the old-aged to the number 
of children raised when young may be another interesting instrument that might be used to promote 
the fertility recovery as well as for optimality purposes (see, Kolmar, 1997; Abio et al, 2004; Fenge 
and Meier, 2005, 2009). 
    While a growing body of literature on the relationship between pensions, fertility, longevity and 
economic growth has been developed in the last decades (see, amongst many others, Zhang et al., 
2001, 2003; Pecchenino and Pollard, 2005), less attention has been paid to the dynamical effects of 
public PAYG pensions in an economy with overlapping generations (OLG) and endogenous 
fertility. 
    As is known, cyclical behaviour can occur in many-good OLG models (Grandmont, 1985) as 
well as in the one-good Diamond-type OLG context (Farmer, 1986; Reichlin, 1986), but only when 
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production factors are relatively complement. Moreover, with myopic foresight, the steady state 
may be oscillatory and exhibit deterministic complex cycles (Michel and de la Croix, 2000, de la 
Croix and Michel, 2002; Fanti and Spataro, 2008), but only when the inter-temporal elasticity of 
substitution in the utility function is higher than unity (i.e., higher than in the case of Cobb-Douglas 
preferences). 
    The aim of this paper is to provide a deeper understanding of the stability effects of public PAYG 
pensions in a textbook OLG economy (e.g. Diamond, 1965) when fertility is endogenous and utility 
and production functions are Cobb-Douglas. It is show that when individuals are short-sighted, the 
introduction of a fertility-related component in the pension formula may have dramatic destabilising 
effects and deterministic chaos appears even for very small-sized PAYG schemes. In such a case, in 
fact, the relative weight of the public pensions in capital accumulation is higher than in the case of a 
pure PAYG scheme. Fertility-related pensions, therefore, act as an economic de-stabiliser in 
overlapping generations economies. 
    The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In section 2 we develop the model. In section 
3 the dynamical features are analysed and discussed. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. The model 
 
2.1. Government 
 
The government redistributes across generations with PAYG transfers from the young to the old 
that are partially or totally linked to the number of children raised when young. At time t , therefore, 
current workers finance pensions to current pensioners, and the fertility-related pay-as-you-go (FR-
PAYG henceforth) pension accounting rule in per worker terms reads as 
 ( )[ ]111 −− +−⋅= tttt nnwp ωωθ , (1) 
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the left-hand side ( tp ) being the pension expenditure and the right-hand side the tax receipts. In 
particular, tw  is the wage earned by the young workers at time t , 10 << θ  is the fixed contribution 
rate and 10 ≤≤ ω  is a weighting parameter of the different distribution rules for total contribution 
to PAYG pensions. In particular, it measures the importance of the individual number of children 
relative to the average number of children in the PAYG system (see, for instance, Kolmar, 1997; 
Abio et al., 2004; Fenge and Meier, 2005, 2009; Fenge and von Weizsäcker, 2010). The polar cases 
0=ω  and 1=ω  imply a pure PAYG scheme and a PAYG scheme totally linked to individual 
fertility, respectively. Therefore, Eq. (1) shows that at time t  PAYG pensions depend on (i) the 
individual rate of fertility at time 1−t , 1−tn , with a share ω  of the contribution, and (ii) the average 
rate of fertility in the whole economy at time 1−t , 1−tn , with a share ω−1  of the contribution. 
Following Fenge and Meier (2005, p. 34), we define the policy variable ω  “the child factor”. 
 
2.2. Individuals 
 
Consider an overlapping generations (OLG) economy populated by identical individuals. Life is 
divided into childhood and adulthood. In the former period each individual does not make economic 
decisions. In the latter period she works and bears children when young and she is retired when old. 
    Only young individuals (of measure tN ) join the workforce. They are endowed with one unit of 
time supplied inelastically on the labour market, while receiving a unitary wage income at the 
competitive rate tw . This income is used to consume, to save, to bear children and to finance 
material consumption of the elderly through the public pension scheme Eq. (1). Raising children is 
costly, and the amount of resources that parents need to take care of them is given by a monetary 
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cost twq  per child, with 10 << q  being the percentage of child-rearing cost on working income.
1
 
Therefore, the budget constraint faced by an individual of the young (child bearing) generation at t  
reads as: 
 ( )θ−=++ 1
,1 ttttt wnwqsc , (2) 
i.e. wage income – net of contributions paid to transfer resources from work time to retirement time 
– is divided into material consumption when young, tc ,1 , savings, ts , and the cost of bearing 
children, ttnwq . 
    Old individuals are retired and live with the amount of resources saved when young plus the 
expected interests accrued at the rate 1+ter  and the expected public pension benefit 1+tep . At time 
1+t , therefore, the budget constraint of an old retired person started working at t  is: 
 ( ) ( )[ ]tttettet nnwsrc ωωθ +−⋅++= +++ 11 111,2 , (3) 
i.e. material consumption when old, 1,2 +tc , is the sum of private savings plus the expected interest 
and the expected public pension benefit. 
    Each adult individual of generation t  draws utility from young-aged consumption ( tc ,1 ), old-aged 
consumption ( 1,2 +tc ) and the number of children she wishes to raise ( tn ).2 Assuming logarithmic 
preferences, the representative individual entering the working period at t  solves the following 
problem: 
 { } ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )tttttttncc nccnccUttt lnlnln,,max 1,2,11,2,1,, 1,2,1 φβ ++= +++ , (4) 
subject to Eqs. (2) and (3), where 10 << β  is the subjective discount factor or, alternatively, the 
individual relative degree of thriftiness, and 10 << φ  captures the parents’ taste for children. 
    The first order conditions for an interior solution are given by: 
                                               
1
 This child cost structure is similar to that adopted by, amongst many others, Wigger (1999) and Boldrin and Jones 
(2002). 
2
 See Eckstein and Wolpin (1985) and Galor and Weil (1996). 
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Eq. (5) equates the marginal rate of substitution between working period consumption and 
retirement period consumption to their relative prices (i.e. the expected interest rate determined on 
the capital market). Eq. (6) equates the marginal rate of substitution between working period 
consumption and the number of children to the expected marginal cost of raising an extra child. 
This cost is given by the difference between the monetary cost of bearing an additional child and 
the present value of the expected pension benefit weighted by the child factor. The higher the child 
factor, the lower the expected net marginal cost of raising an extra child. If 0=ω  (pure PAYG 
pensions), the cost of child rearing is only determined as a share of the working income. In contrast, 
if 10 ≤< ω  (FR-PAYG pensions), a positive inter-generational effect exists that causes a reduction 
in the gross monetary cost of children due to the higher benefit received by each pensioner, i.e. 
individuals want to substitute young-aged consumption with children. 
    Now, combining Eqs. (5) and (6) with the individual lifetime budget constraint gives the demand 
for children and the saving rate, respectively: 
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Eq. (7) determines the individual number of children in a partial equilibrium context. A rise in the 
child factor causes a positive inter-generational effect that reduces the marginal cost of child 
bearing and thus increases fertility ( 0/ >∂∂ ωtn ). Eq. (8), instead, determines the saving rate in a 
partial equilibrium context. It reveals that the child factor plays a twofold counterbalancing role: (a) 
it reduces the saving rate because individuals will expect a higher pension benefit as long as the 
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number of their descendant raises (i.e. the expected public pension component – the second term in 
square brackets of Eq. 8 – increases, while keeping the private saving component unaffected – the 
first term in square brackets of Eq. 8), and (b) it increases the saving rate since a higher child factor 
makes more convenient to substitute young-aged consumption with children at time t  (i.e. reduces 
the denominator of Eq. 8). However, the final (partial equilibrium) effect of a rise in the child factor 
on savings is negative ( 0/ <∂∂ ωts ), that is the positive saving-effect (b) is always dominated by 
the negative saving-effect (a). 
 
2.3. Firms 
 
Firms are identical and act competitively on the market. Aggregate production at time t  ( tY ) takes 
place by combining capital ( tK ) and labour ( tt NL =  in equilibrium) according to the constant 
returns to scale Cobb-Douglas technology αα −= 1ttt LAKY , where 0>A  is a scale parameter and 
10 << α  is the output elasticity of capital. Defining ttt NKk /:=  and ttt NYy /:=  as capital and 
output per worker, respectively, the intensive form production function may be written as 
α
tt Aky = . Assuming total depreciation of capital at the end of each period and normalising the 
price of final output to unity, profit maximisation implies that factor inputs are paid their marginal 
products, that is: 
 11 −= −αα tt Akr , (9) 
 ( ) αα tt Akw −= 1 . (10) 
 
2.4. Equilibrium 
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Given the government budget Eq. (1) and knowing that population evolves according to 
ttt NnN =+1 , market-clearing in goods and capital markets is expressed (in per worker terms) as 
 ttt skn =+1 . (11) 
Using Eqs. (7) and (8) to substitute out for tn  and ts , respectively, equilibrium implies: 
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Eq. (12) shows that the equilibrium stock of capital at 1+t  is determined as the difference between 
the private saving component and the expected public pension component at t , both divided by the 
taste or children. The former (the first addendum on the right-hand side of Eq. 12) exclusively 
depends on the willingness to save out of wage income – given the assumption of Cobb-Douglas 
preferences. The latter (the second addendum on the right-hand side of Eq. 12) depends on the 
expected values of both the wage and interest rates. 
    The existence of a fertility-related component in the PAYG system ( 10 ≤< ω ) has two important 
effects on capital accumulation: first, it makes the crowding out effect of public pensions on private 
savings much stronger than the case of pure PAYG pensions ( 0=ω ); second, it makes the 
individual degree of thriftiness ( β ) as a potential destabilising parameter. A rise in degree of 
parsimony, in fact, increases both the private saving component and the public pension component 
and, hence, its final effect on capital accumulation may be ambiguous. 
    Below we study how the dynamic path of capital accumulation evolves depending on whether 
individuals have either perfect or myopic expectations. 
 
2.4.1. Perfect foresight 
 
With perfect foresight, the expected interest and wage rates depend on the future value of the per 
worker stock of capital, that is 
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    Combining Eqs. (9), (10), (12) and (13), the dynamic equilibrium sequence of capital can be 
written as 
 
( )
( )( )
α
φωβαθφα
ααβ
tt k
Aqk ⋅
+−+
−
=+ 1
1
1 . (14) 
Steady-state implies *1 kkk tt ==+ , so that: 
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2.4.2. Myopic foresight 
 
With myopic foresight, the expected interest and wage rates depend on the current value of the per 
worker stock of capital, that is 
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    Combining Eqs. (9), (10), (12) and (16), the dynamic path of capital accumulation is now given 
by: 
 
( ) ttt kAkqk α
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φωβθαφ
β α −
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111 . (17) 
The steady-state is still determined by Eq. (15), see Michel and De La Croix (2000). 
    Despite Eq. (17) is a simple first order non-linear difference equation, the dynamics of capital 
may be highly non-linear and endogenous fluctuations may emerge. The local stability properties of 
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a double Cobb-Douglas economy with endogenous fertility, FR-PAYG pensions and myopic 
expectations are analysed in the next section.3 
 
3. Local stability with myopic expectations 
 
From Eqs. (15) and (17), the following proposition holds: 
 
Proposition 1. In a double Cobb-Douglas OLG economy with endogenous fertility, FR-PAYG 
pensions and short-sighted individuals the dynamics of capital is the following. 
 
(1) Let 30 αα <<  hold. Then 1<< θθ , and: 
(1.1) if θθ <<0 , the dynamics of capital is monotonic and convergent to *k ; 
(1.2) if θθθ << , the dynamics of capital is oscillatory and convergent to *k ; 
(1.3) if θθ = , a flip bifurcation emerges; 
(1.4) if 1<< θθ , the dynamics of capital is oscillatory and divergent to *k . 
 
(2) Let 13 ααα <<  hold. Then 1<θ , 1>θ , and: 
(2.1) if θθ <<0 , the dynamics of capital is monotonic and convergent to *k ; 
(2.2) if 1<< θθ , the dynamics of capital is oscillatory and convergent to *k . 
 
(3) Let 11 << αα  hold. Then 1>> θθ , and the dynamics of capital is monotonic and convergent 
to *k  for any 10 << θ , 
                                               
3
 The (local) stability properties of an economy with perfect foresight is briefly presented in Appendix A. Different 
from the case with myopic expectation, with rational expectations the economy does not exhibit any interesting 
dynamical feature. 
 10 
 
where 
 ( ) ( ) φωβ
φ
α
α
ωφβαθθ
+
⋅
−
== 2
2
1
:,,, , (18) 
 ( ) ( )( ) α
αθφωβ
φ
α
αα
ωφβαθθ +⋅=
+
⋅
−
+
==
1
1
1
:,,, 2 , (19) 
 ( ) ( )[ ] 12/1,1:,, 111 <<+−+== αφωβφφωβωβωφβαα , (20) 
 ( ) ( )[ ] 1333 3/1,98322 1:,, ααφωβφφωβωβωφβαα <<+−+== . (21) 
 
Proof. Differentiating Eq. (17) with respect to tk  and using Eq. (15) gives: 
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Monotonic and non-monotonic dynamics 
 
From Eq. (22), the condition 0*1
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where θθ =  (defined by Eq. 18) represents the value of the contribution rate below (beyond) which 
the dynamics of capital is monotonic (non-monotonic). In particular, 1<θ  ( 1>θ ) for any 
10 αα <<  ( 11 << αα ). Moreover, 1<θ  if and only if 1αα <  and 2αα > , where 1α  is defined by 
Eq. (20) and ( ) ( )[ ]φωβφφωβ
ωβωφβαα +++==
1
:,,22 . Since 12/1 1 << α  and 12 >α  for any 
β , φ  and 10 ≤< ω , then the case 2αα >  can be ruled out. 
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Therefore, in the case of monotonic dynamics the economy always converges to the stationary state 
irrespective of the size of the pension system, i.e. 10 *1 <∂
∂
<
=
+
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t
t
tk
k
 for any 10 << θ . 
 
Non-monotonic dynamics: stability analysis 
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where θθθ >=  (defined by Eq. 19) is the flip bifurcation value of the contribution rate, i.e. the 
threshold value of θ  below (beyond) which the steady state is stable (unstable). In particular, 1<θ  
( 1>θ ) for any 30 αα <<  ( 13 << αα ). Moreover, 1<θ  if and only if 3αα <  and 4αα > , where 
3α  is defined by Eq. (21), ( ) ( )[ ]φωβφφωβωβωφβαα 98322 1:,,44 +++==  and 13 αα < . Since 
133/1 αα <<  and 14 >α  for any β , φ  and 10 ≤< ω , then the case 4αα >  can be ruled out. 
    Therefore, 
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 for any 1<< θθ . This proves point (1); 
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(ii) if 13 ααα <<  then 1<θ , 1>θ  and (2.1) 10 *1 <∂
∂
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k
 for any θθ <<0 , and (2.2) 
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 for any 1<< θθ . This proves point (2); 
 
(iii) if 11 << αα  then 1>> θθ  and 10 *1 <∂
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k
 for any 10 << θ . This proves point 
(3). Q.E.D. 
 
Proposition 1 can easily be interpreted as follows: the stock of capital installed at time 1+t  is 
determined as the saving rate divided by the number of children at time t  (see Eqs. 7, 8 and 11). 
Therefore, the accumulation of capital depends on difference between the private saving component 
and the public pension component, both divided by the taste for children (see Eq. 12). With Cobb-
Douglas utility, the private saving component exclusively depends on the marginal willingness to 
save out of wage income, and reflects the positive effect on capital accumulation of a higher 
working income following a rise in tk . In contrast, the public pension component depends on both 
the expected pension benefit and the expected interest rate, and reflects the negative (crowding out) 
effect on capital accumulation following a rise in tk . If the private saving component dominates (is 
dominated by) the public pension component, the dynamics of capital is monotonic (non-
monotonic). When production is relatively labour-oriented and the contribution rate is low enough, 
the private saving component dominates and thus the dynamics of the economy is monotonic and 
the steady state is always stable, i.e., the so-called saddle node bifurcation can never occur. A rise in 
the contribution rate increases the relative weight of the public pension component and a non-
monotonic unstable dynamics emerges in that case. In contrast, when production is relatively 
capital-oriented the dynamics is always monotonic irrespective of the size of the PAYG system. 
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    We now perform a sensitivity analysis of the critical values of the contribution rate which 
discriminates between monotonic and non-monotonic dynamics (see Eq. 18), as well as between 
non-monotonic stable and unstable dynamics (see Eq. 19) in the cases of both FR-PAYG pensions 
( 10 ≤< ω ) and pure PAYG ( 0=ω ) pensions. 
    Analysis of Eqs. (18) and (19) gives the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 2. The risk of cyclical instability with FR-PAYG pensions is higher than with pure 
PAYG pensions. A rise in the distributive capital share (α ) monotonically reduces the risk of 
cyclical instability irrespective of the pension scheme. Moreover, while with pure PAYG pensions a 
change in the individual degree of thriftiness ( β ), and/or in the taste for children (φ ) is neutral for 
stability, with FR-PAYG pensions a rise in the child factor (ω ), and/or in the individual degree of 
thriftiness, and a reduction in the taste for children increases the risk of cyclical instability. 
 
Proof. First, in the case of pure PAYG pensions ( 0=ω ) Eq. (18) becomes ( ) ( )2
2
1
:
α
α
αθθ
−
==  
(i.e., the value of the contribution rate which discriminates between monotonic and non-monotonic 
dynamics is independent of both the subjective discount factor and taste for children), so that 
( ) 1<αθ  ( ( ) 1>αθ ) for any 2/10 << α  ( 12/1 << α ). Therefore, with FR-PAYG pensions 
( 10 ≤< ω ) the width of the parametric region in the space ( )θα ,  where non-monotonic dynamics 
are possible is larger than the corresponding region with pure PAYG pensions ( 0=ω ). This means 
that when 10 ≤< ω , the threshold ( )ωφβαθ ,,,  can be smaller than unity even when 12/1 << α . 
Second, in the case of pure PAYG pensions ( 0=ω ) Eq. (19) becomes ( ) ( )
α
α
αθαθθ +⋅== 1:  (i.e., 
the flip bifurcation value of the contribution rate is independent of both the subjective discount 
factor and taste for children), so that ( ) 1<αθ  ( ( ) 1>αθ ) for any 3/10 << α  ( 13/1 << α ). 
Therefore, with FR-PAYG pensions ( 10 ≤< ω ) the width of the parametric region in the space 
 14 
( )θα ,  where non-monotonic unstable dynamics are possible is larger than the corresponding region 
with pure PAYG pensions ( 0=ω ). This means that when 10 ≤< ω , the flip bifurcation value 
( )ωφβαθ ,,,  can be smaller than unity even when 13/1 << α . 
    Moreover, from Eq. (19) we get: 
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3 >
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+
=
∂
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for any 10 ≤≤ ω , and 
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φωβα
βωαα
φ
θ
, (29) 
for any 10 ≤< ω . Q.E.D. 
 
    Figures 1 and 2 illustrate Proposition 2 and compare the parametric regions in the space ( )θα ,  
that describe the (stable) monotonic and (stable and unstable) non-monotonic dynamics in the cases 
of pure PAYG pensions (Figure 1) and FR-PAYG pensions (Figure 2). It is clearly shown that 
while in a pure PAYG context cyclical instability arises only when 3/1<α , in a FR-PAYG context 
the cyclical unstable region in the space ( )θα ,  is larger because of the destabilising effects played 
by the child factor, the individual degree of thriftiness and the taste for children. 
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Figure 1. Case 0=ω  (pure PAYG pensions). Stability and instability regions in the space ( )θα , . 
 
 
Figure 2. Case 10 ≤< ω  (FR-PAYG pensions). Stability and instability regions in the space ( )θα , . 
 
Table 1. Parametric instability regions ( 10 << θ ) under different PAYG systems. 
Pure PAYG ( 0=ω ) Mixed FR-PAYG ( 10 << ω ) Pure FR-PAYG ( 1=ω ) 
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3/10 << α  ( )ωφβαα ,,0 3<<  ( )1,,0 3 φβαα <<  
 
Table 1 summarises for three different PAYG schemes the threshold values of the output elasticity 
of capital below which cyclically instability may emerge. Since ( ) ( ) 3/1,,1,, 33 >> ωφβαφβα , it is 
evident that persistent cycles more likely occurs when the weight of individual fertility in the 
PAYG system is high. 
    Moreover, from Proposition 2 we may derive the following results as regards the effects of the 
preference parameters on the stability of the economy: 
 
Result 1. To the extent that fertility is low because the preference for children is low (e.g. developed 
countries), the introduction of FR-PAYG pensions ( 10 ≤< ω ) generates a higher risk of cyclical 
instability than when fertility is high because the preference for children is high (e.g. under-
developed or developing countries). 
 
Result 2. To the extent that the degree of thriftiness is high because the financial education of 
individuals is high (e.g. developed countries), the introduction of FR-PAYG pensions ( 10 ≤< ω ) 
generates a higher risk of cyclical instability than when the degree of thriftiness is low because the 
financial education of individuals is low (e.g. under-developed or developing countries). 
 
Results 1 and 2 lead to a rather paradoxical policy effect: since the introduction of FR-PAYG 
pensions is essentially advocated in economies with low fertility in order to overcome the 
sustainability issue of the widespread PAYG systems, our results imply that in economies where the 
taste for children is relatively low the instability risk induced by a pension reform that links the 
pension arrangement received when old to the number of children chosen when young is high. This 
result holds because a reduction in the taste for children increases the relative weight of the public 
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pension component in equilibrium and thus contributes to destabilise the economy, while keeping 
the private saving component unaffected (see Eq. B1 in Appendix B). 
    Another paradoxical result can be derived about the effect of the parameter that describes the 
financial education of individuals when FR-PAYG pensions exist. A rise in subjective discount 
factor, in fact, means that individuals wish to smooth consumption over the retirement period and, 
hence, save more when young. This apparently causes a positive stabilising effect. However, the 
analysis of the local stability properties of the steady state reveals that β  is neutral on the private 
saving component while increasing the relative weight of the public pension component, and thus 
acts as a destabilising device. Therefore, in a country where the individual degree of thriftiness is 
high because the financial education is high (e.g. developed countries which, unfortunately, are 
those most plagued by under-population and then prone to consider FR pension reforms), the 
introduction of a FR-PAYG scheme may cause unstable cycles and, as shown in the next section, 
even chaotic motions. 
 
3.1. Chaotic dynamics: a numerical experiment 
 
We are now interested in showing the emergence of deterministic chaos in a double Cobb-Douglas 
economy with FR-PAYG pensions. 
    In Figures 3-5 we depict the bifurcation diagrams for the parameter θ  (on the horizontal axis), 
with respect to three different values of the child factor (ω ). We take the following parameter set 
(only for illustrative purposes): 10=A , 25.0=α , 60.0=β , 05.0=φ , 15.0=q  and 10.00 =k  (the 
initial value of the stock of capital). The vertical axis shows the limit points of the equilibrium 
sequence of capital, *k . When the contribution rate is relatively low a unique limit point exists. 
When the contribution rate raises a period doubling bifurcation emerges. Larger PAYG pensions 
imply that period doubling bifurcations appear more and more rapidly, thus bringing the economy 
into the chaotic region. As it is evident, the chaotic behaviour generated by FR-PAYG pensions 
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more likely appears when the weight of children in determining the size of the pension arrangement 
is high. In fact, the flip bifurcation value of the contribution rate dramatically shrinks from 
5555.0=θ  to 0427.0=θ  when the social security system shifts from a pure PAYG scheme to a 
pure FR-PAYG scheme. This of course increases the risk of cyclical instability. In fact, when 
PAYG pensions are fully linked to individual fertility, a small-sized pension system ( 054.0=θ ) 
directly brings the economy into the chaotic region. 
    Therefore, although fertility-related pensions are often advocated as a possible remedy against 
the peril of the future sustainability of unfunded public pensions as well as for optimality purposes 
(see Abio et al., 2004), the transition from a pure PAYG system (Figure 3) to a PAYG system 
partially (Figure 4) or totally (Figure 5) linked to individual fertility may easily open the route to 
deterministic chaos even in presence of small-sized public pensions. 
 
Figure 3. Case 0=ω  (pure PAYG scheme). Bifurcation diagram for θ  ( 5555.0=θ ). 
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Figure 4. Case 50.0=ω  (mixed FR-PAYG scheme). Bifurcation diagram for θ  ( 0793.0=θ ). 
 
 
Figure 5. Case 1=ω  (pure FR-PAYG scheme). Bifurcation diagram for θ  ( 0427.0=θ ). 
 
4. Conclusions 
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We analysed the dynamics of an overlapping generations economy with endogenous fertility and 
fertility-related pay-as-you-go public pensions when individuals are myopic foresighted. 
    We showed that a fertility-related pension reform dramatically increases the risk of cyclical 
instability generated by the PAYG system. Moreover, the existence of a fertility-related component 
in the pension formula generates two counterintuitive policy effects: a rise in the individual degree 
of thriftiness and a reduction is taste for children both increase the area of cyclical instability. In 
fact, the capital accumulation function is divided into two components: the private saving 
component and the public pension component. What is important for stability is the relative size of 
the latter component. With FR-PAYG pensions, the more individuals wish to smooth consumption 
over their retirement period and the less is the taste for children, the higher is the relative weight of 
the public pension component, i.e. both parameters act as economic de-stabilisers. 
    Therefore, a double Cobb-Douglas economy with FR-PAYG pensions and myopic foresighted 
individuals contains in itself the possibility of deterministic complex cycles. 
    Our results have a twofold interpretation: (i) constitute a policy warning about the risks of 
(cyclical) instability caused by PAYG pension schemes in presence of realistic myopia of 
individuals, and (ii) they represent an explanation of the occurrence of persistent cycles in 
economies with endogenous fertility. 
 
Appendix A 
 
In this appendix we briefly show that the dynamics of a Cobb-Douglas OLG economy with FR-
PAYG pensions and perfect foresight cannot be cyclical. 
 
Proposition A.1. The dynamics of capital in a double Cobb-Douglas OLG economy with FR-PAYG 
pensions and perfect foresighted individuals is always monotonic and convergent to *k . 
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Proof. Differentiating Eq. (14) with respect to tk  and using Eq. (15) we find: 
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 for any 10 << θ . Q.E.D. 
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